"Diagrammatic Bodies"

We are all partial bodies,
now, into the future.

One element in Robert Cooper's work which I think is central to it but which may be lost in a reading determined by the traditional parameters of organizational theory is the theorization of the organization of bodies, and especially, the relation of the human body to technological objects. This is an especially important questions because it symbolizes the relation of the human body to other bodies, such as 'natural bodies' and even other human bodies. The traditional mode of this relation, I will argue, is one of subjective lack. Briefly put, 'subjective lack' means that whatever is read as 'other' or as 'object' is primarily read in terms of the (or a) human body, a body which is not only understood as primary in any social analysis, but is understood in terms of its own self-creative composition (which critiques such as Gasché's (1986) term, 'auto-affective presence' seek to reveal). Hence, even in reading the human body as lack and the other body as supplement, the supplement is read in terms of its fulfilling a lack which is not its own. Against such a traditional reading of bodies as dominated by the classical human subject, I will argue that all bodies are partial and that bodies gain their specifiicity as bodies based on strongly mutual relations. I will further argue that subjectivity is granted to bodies only through the co-presence (Heidegger, Mitsein) of other bodies in space. The consequences of such arguments are, among many others, that traditional divisions between the 'human,' the 'technological,' and the 'animal' are blurred. What I hope to do, also, is to reinvigorate notions of passivity and negativity in relation to the creation of freedom and history for that series of beings we always provisionally call 'human' beings.

Cooper's work investigates the general problematic of organization with various themes: that of inside-outside, that of folds, and that of proximity and distance. Such themes are investigated according to procedures associate with dominant names in the history of phenomenology and post-structural theory (Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, among others). Each of these themes not only carries problems about the logic of social space, but also about the role of bodies in constructing that space.

Poststructural theory frequently disrupts claims about the self-presence and self-representation of bodies, attacking claims of autonomy derived from organic and

dialectical theories. by demonstrating that claims of autonomous, auto-affective presence are dependent upon exteriorities or excesses to those claims (and their respective body or bodies), traditional claims of presence and autonomy may not only be deconstructed, but presence and supplementation can be shown as logically bound to one another in a way that problematizes traditional ontology and the neoclassical politics of individuality. This means that we must trace back the relation of subject and object beyond their particular economies of force and pay attention to those more general economies which exceed both terms, and which set up the conditions for subject and object, presence and supplement, lack and projection.

Deconstructing and retheorizing the subject's investment of objects with desire, however, is complicated. Within traditional psychoanalysis, for example, subjective investments of desire may involve not only 'traditional' objects, but also persons and parts of persons ('part-objects'). Such investments may be in the form of content projections (as in Freud's penis envy), in the form of the subject's own lack (as in the Lacanian reading of castration) or, as in Winnicott (1971), may be transitional investments toward 'higher' forms of development. In each of these cases, however, the 'normal' economy of investment aims toward achieving a presence of person qua the ideal of the classical subject. In Freud, this presence is achieved by the 'resolution'--however compromised--of Oedipal conflicts. In Lacan (at least the Lacan of the 1954-5 seminar on the ego), presence is achieved by a recognition of the otherness of the other, and thus, the other ceasing to carry the imaginary object of my own lack (what could be read as an incorporation of castration--the same outcome as Freudian analysis). In Winnicott, the transitional object is a momentary compensation for a more original loss which must be redeemed. What is common to these analysts is that the object tends to lose its own ability to determine the scale upon which the subject can and will be measured and upon which the subject may develop. Further, the social conditions for the choice of object remain largely uninterrogated. Space and time become irrelevant other than as being structures for narratives of developmental phases, illnesses, and fixations. In short, all positive possibilities for analysing the object are themselves castrated and territorialized into a reductive form of analysis. The object loses its ability to positively constitute the subject according to the object's own terms, and further, the very synthesis of subject and object remains unanalysed outside the sanctioned structures of family, culture, and state. As Deleuze and Guattari write of Freud's analysis of the Wolf-Man: six, seven wolves are present, and yet Freud feels free to interpret them in terms of the father (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 38).

There are two general problems which occur when attempting to free the object of this type of reduction to subjective lack. The first, of course, is to interrogate the logic of reading the object as representing a lack of the subject (in other words, as an intensified representational projection of an ideal subject or some part of an ideal subject). This follows the critical path of Derrrida's deconstruction of subject-object, presence-supplement relationships. Second, it requires a positive reading of the

results of this critique, and a rereading of the position of the object and the subject--now as generalized as well as specific bodies--in space.

Supplementation

Despite Cooper's (1993) attentiveness to problems of the organized body, there is one point in his essay, 'Technologies of Representation,' where the logic of supplementation appears. It will be useful to focus briefly on this part in order to advance our analysis. Cooper's argument cites Scarry's discussion of technological objects as supplements or replacements for the human body's lack. A chair, for example, is accorded three aspects of representation: "as body part, it re-presents the spine; as bodily need, it re-presents body weight; as a more general projection, it re-presents sentient awareness" (Cooper, 1993: 281). Cooper's hyphenation in 're-presentation' emphasizes that he is discussing representation as the replication of a prior bodily presence. Yet, a the same time, there are several other logics being pursued: representation as the representation of a part of the body, representation as a lack of a part as well as a lack within the body as a whole, and representation as the fulfillment of the subject's wish ("The shape of the chair....represents...not just a perception of an actuality (my tiredness) but also the possibility of reversing that actuality, i.e., feeling the tiredness and wishing it gone" (Cooper, 1993: 281).) In brief, the term 'representation' contains logics of repetition, extension, and displacement.

None of this invalidates Cooper's argument about representation in his essay. What I want to argue, however, is that the multiplicity of meanings above is masked by the singular term, 'representation,' and that by working through this logic of supplementation, other modes of analysing objects may be arrived at.

There is a great temptation to read technological objects as extensions of the human body and as extensions which eventually come to replace that body. There are both older humanist and contemporary critiques which apocalyptically warn of replacement of 'the body' by 'orders of simulacra' (Baudrillard, 1983).

But extensions and displacments are not necessarily replacements or 're-presentations.' In Derrida's work, for example, the priority of the supplement over any original and originating presence results in a trail of supplementarity--of signifiers without any transcendental signified. Translation, as a term for the general economy of representation, for example, entails a repetition whose very iteration allows a signified, but in which no original term may strictly be referred to as 're-placed or 're-presented' since there is not presence that could be cited as originary. Whereas Baudrillard's notion of the simulacrum carries a strong sense of mourning for a 'real' (and thus, a debt to that logic of the real), Derrida's (1976) work problematizes the logic of any originary real and suggests that bodies are site--and time--specific according to the inscriptions of language and other modes of writing (écriture générale). Thus, 'displacement' entails not a re-placement of an originary body, but rather a translation of an already translated series of signs. This

does not mean that the body, say the human body, does not contain empirical resistances to interpretation and is not itself empirical, but rather that the reading of that empiricism cannot escape the conceptualizations which determine it. To put this another way, we must remember that for Saussure and the critique of signification which Derrida develops from that source, signifieds are not empirical, but rather, they are conceptual. Cooper, along with Heidegger, Virilio, and many others, is correct in warning of the replacement of the real by universalizing, systematic readings. The problem, however, is not that of masking the real by series of signs, but rather of failing to account for the historicity of signs which constitute and produce that real. The problem of the simulacrum lies in the reification of what is already conceptually there. It also lies in a dire neglect of the negativities and resistances created by bodies reading and writing each other into relations and existence; that is, in neglecting the autopoietic spacings of the real which occur in spite of the conditioning restraints of structural power.

Thus, technological objects as 'extensions' of 'the body' must now be read and understood not according to mimetic epistemologies of 're-presentation,' but according to the constructions of bodies and space by pragmatic, affective relations between bodies. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'the Body without Organs' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987) is useful here because it allows that bodies are not self-constructed, bur rather, that they are given specificity according to forces, fluxes, and movements of 'territorialization' and 'deterritorialization' which are neither fully exterior to nor fully interior within those bodies. These terms are not in opposition to each other, but rather, they denote the construction of beings and becomings through forces of production and through lines of transversal flight across production machines (i.e., productive bodies and assemblages of bodies). Consequently, the term 'extensive objects' no longer refers to appendages to 'the body,' but now must be understood as sites for the mutation and construction of bodies according to various modes of production, expression, and planes of meaning.

As Deleuze and Guattari (1983) argue in Anti-Oedipus and in reference to Lewis Mumford in A Thousand Plateaus (1987: 457), the term 'production machine' refers to technological, human, and natural bodies in productive chains of relations without which they would not be. Production machines produce not simply objects and subjects, but, more fundamentally, the actions and meanings by which objects and subjects come to be. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the term, 'machine' is not here a metaphor, but rather it covers a variety of linked productive agencies cutting across traditional ontological categories (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 36). For example, technological and human bodies link with one another in production; in use, in being used up, and in being hooked on one another (the narcotic language of early computer jargon, as well as literature, is useful here (see, for example, Ronell's (1992) Crack Wars).) Further, discursive production and technological production work upon each other to such a degree that essentialist distinctions are impossible to determine. Historically, technological production takes place within the context of discourses about production, invention, and use. On the other hand, certain

discursive productions are only possible through the presence of certain technical machines--whether those machines function as rhetorical tropes for discursive production or as actual tools for the production of those discourses (e.g., personal computers and word-processing software allow the writing and editing of this essay in a way not possible twenty years ago). Out of such mixed economies, the relations of 'subject' and 'object,' 'human and 'machine,' 'man' and 'animal' develop and change, both concretely and abstractly. The subject's body, therefore, cannot be posited as 'the body' independent of its relations of production, nor can the 'object' be situated as a mere thing, solely of a technological or of a 'natural' order. All bodies both express external elements of force and internal elements of resistance in their linkages as production machines. Not only does the human body not have any clear and distinct positive boundaries, but moreover, the traditional category of 'the human' fails to be anything other than generalizations of specific temporal relations with other beings--'animal,' 'technological,' and even other humans. In this way, the Enlightenment 'question of man,' for example, is no longer a question of essence, but is instead a possibility for being according to how a variety of bodies-- including the 'human'--touch or affect one another in space and time (including different types and modes of 'memory'). The 'being' of each body is not the expression of a single internal or external code, nor does it represent a universal essence, rather it follows from the in-common relation of bodies to one another and their relays of replies. (For arguments developing the concept of 'singularity' from the 'in-common,' see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, and Agamben, 1993).

The construction of bodies in space and their being as a function of such activity precludes the possibility of a 'return to the body' that could refer to a return to an autonomous agency of self or originary coding. Bodies are spatially related and their being is expressed in terms of site-specific and time-relevant forces. Possibilities for invention, becoming, and flight demand that such relations be constituted both by a heterogeneity of forces and by a negativity of space so that transversal movements between levels and types of production are, indeed, possible. Within closed systems, transversal movements are of a very limited duration and lead, creatively, nowhere.

Politically speaking, heterogeneity, as a principle of a truly public space and policy, means not simply acknowledging or allowing a multiplicity of elements or production within a structured space, but of linking conceptual abstract machines with concrete relations and of allowing negative spaces for withdrawal and subject formations so that transversal movements between levels become not only theorizable but actual and so that the event of history may occur. Transversal relations need a possible negativity in space through which bodies can radically position themselves and engage lines of flight, becoming dynamic agents of radical re-evalation and change. As Maurice Blanchot has suggested throughout his writings, agency is created by withdrawals in-between the syntactic folds of productive bodies. Withdrawal, the 'pas' (the 'not' or the 'step back' of passivity), drags back with it former structurations of subjects and objects, perverting and 'defamiliarizing' (the Russian formalist's, ostranenie) their expression and reinvesting desire along lines of flight. (On the 'pas' see Maurice Blanchot, The Step

Not Beyond (Le Pas au-delà); for relevant commentary on this work, see Herman Rapaport, 1989, Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language.) Radical (re-)evaluation is a form of creation because it attempts to redraw back and re-open the form of bodies as agents of flight. It constitutes an opening of bodies and assemblages to those excesses which mark their productive limits within established structure and code. If this ontological negativity is barred and all agency and space are strictly confined to an efficiency of positive production, then there is no future since there is no excess which would allow a future in any shape other than the present-past. (See Heidegger, 1962, especially in regard to the concept of wiederholen [section 74]; in regard to folds and time, see Deleuze, 1988, 199.)

Withdrawal is not a lone phenomenon which is important only to an individual subject, nor is its actively always oriented toward re-evaluation, reinvention, and historical projection (the catatonic's silence can be read as an act of critique which does not 'progress' and so too the punk's refusal to 'come through'). Withdrawal, however, can display, cripple, and even destroy the everyday effects, affects, and power of territorializing production machines, through such events may at first appear to be 'local.' Every body replies to space and to other bodies' position in it and toward it. The closing down of the body--the determined body of passive refusal--to compulsive, repetitive, consumption machines may mean the re-opening of the body to other lines of agency and flight, through such lines may not yet be known or available (they may be blocked at more distant organizational levels). Silence cannot simply be analysed as stagnancy, but must also be analysed as a resistive political strategy brought about by the concrete's relation to a reified abstract production which long ago foreclosed the possibility for interruption. Silence's 'no' often prepares the conditions for something else, if only by determining that evaluation will not be a standardized affair and that normative production machines will not be allowed to 'do their thing' here.

Subjectivity and the fold

We have just argued that subjectivity, in terms of the creation of a becoming agency, must be thought through a negativity which remains unacknowledged in the traditional productive understanding of the subject as will and other bodies and space as representation. Agency lies in wait for the subject because subjectivity is given with the folds of being. In terms of a broad but traditional bourgeois topology of space, such 'folds' are the externalities of 'public' space incorporated into the psyche and the psychological projections and purposeful determinations which invest persons into public space. The traditional spaces of inside and outside, private and public--in other words, the defining terms for bourgeois space--are made problematic, however, by the very concept of folds. This is because the investment of the public in the private and the private in the public creates the merging of both ideals of personhood, as well as necessitating that a multiplicity of micro-folds may be present through the former ideological domains.

It is important to note that within production, linkage points between machines and boundaries at the limits of machines constitute folds wherein the joining, mixing, repression, and rupture of normative production lines can most obviously appear. For example, the fundamental constitution and self-legitimation of new disciplinary fields by metaphors borrowed from older paradigms (for example, the very notion of disciplinary field itself) displays foreign seams within the essential territory of a discipline. (For more on the concepts of 'the fold' and 'folds,' see Cooper, 1993; Deleuze, 1988; 1993.)

How is it possible to think and act as if folds were socially and psychologically existent and were, moreover, politically viable sites for the construction of a subjective agency radically different from that of the traditional subject? We cannot assume that this is the case within a cultural tradition which stresses the subjective will of 'man' and brings all within the domination of this concept. Our inheritance of nineteenth-century European historiography stresses the singular nature of will over all those beings reduced to a conquered passivity and silence (for example, the mass of humanity and all which is then relegated to the term 'animal'). But it is exactly this position of determined passivity and 'silence,' both at the level of the everyday and at the level of historical construction, which must be thought as the origin of freedom and historical event. In other words, if we are to account for historical events in anything other than mythological terms, we must turn from the thinking of history as will and representation to the thinking of historical event in terms of the strategic occupation of folds and the passive and active opening of beings to lines of movement and flight.

In his book on Foucault, Deleuze poses subjectivity in terms of strategy: 'What can I be, with what folds can I surround myself or how can I produce myself as a subject?' (Deleuze, 1988: 114). As Deleuze indicates, these specific questions are bound together not by their location on a single plane of existential will (for example, Sartre's existentialism), but rather they are bound together by a project of creating a subjective agent out of time-valued and site-specific limitations and specific affects. Deleuze's questions already require a working through or 'deconstruction' of the classical subject (such as Cooper undertakes when he analyses the concepts of 'inside' and 'outside' in his work). Both the structuralist assumptions of clear and distinct boundaries for analysis and the humanist assumptions of privileged autonomous agents fail to account for the important question of how subjectivity is created and determined by the co-presence of bodies in space. Likewise, as I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, dialectical analysis fails because it remains haunted by the notion of lack which draws it back to privileging one subject over another. Co-presence must be thought within the notion of lack if it is to take seriously the fundamental relations of space and subjective agency. Since there is no way to think postmodernism without taking as primary problems of space, scale, and affect, one completely fails to think the postmodern subject within epistemes predominantly governed by the concept of lack.

As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) suggest, the becoming agency of the subject along lines of flight is not due to the will of the subject, but rather to the transversal engagement of heterogeneously located bodies, assemblages, and lines of production. Subjective agency is not an essential property of the subject, but it appears at certain moments for the organism, empowering it to disengage from standard production machines and to re-engaged and make active and real transversal trajectories running through various levels of production. Such flight engages and re-encodes productive bodies through their cuts and furrows which open them to the world of materials and which form their genealogical tracings from the past and into the future. Nomadic flight is precisely possible because of the historical graftings, limitations, and openings of productive bodies to one another in a negative space.

Foremost, it is necessary to recognize that bodies are always already marked and cut, not from the moment of familial castration or symbolic initiation, but far before the conceptualization of 'the body.' Always, the body is deterritorialized and diagrammatically drawn ahead of itself. This is why its openings are so important: they determine the machines, sites, and lines which may engage the body and the type of subjectivity that the body may assume. Some of these openings begin at birth: the child is drawn ahead of him or herself into a curiosity about animals and plants--real, represented, imaginary, and historical--surrounding him and her ('What are these? What are they called? What can I do with them? How doe they die? Can I eat them? Will they harm me?--and much later: 'What are their general relationships (to me)?) in the same way that the flower is drawn forth (as Freud put it, treiben) into the opening of the air and sun. Later, other openings are etched upon the body and they appear in no set chronological order. Determinations of 'inside' and 'outside,' 'subject' and 'object,' 'before' and 'after' are fall-outs of previous 'in-common' engagements. Relays of replies draw the body forth and within. Lines of becoming remark the in-common of touch (which occurs on various surfaces, drawing according to various specific and overlapping grammars: 'physical,' 'linguistic,' 'visual,' and so on). Touch and feel construct bodies from the inside-out/outside-in--the body of affective folds--from openings, grafts, seams, and cuts, moving bodies from territorial rifts (Riss) to exposing those rifts to flight to territoriality to flight, and so on. Touch transcends and reconstitutes memories of the body. Traditionally, we may say that touch turns 'the body' inside out, exposing it to the light of the day and the darkness of the night, so that day and night may be folded back and come to constitute the self. Flesh is the after-effect (and after-affect, Freud's Nächtraglichkeit) of touch, a moment of the body's limit in the transcendence of the world. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

A becoming is always in the middle; a becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border or line of descent running perpendicular to both. If becoming is a block (a line-block), it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility....The line, or the block, does not link the wasp and the orchid, any more than it conjugates or mixes them: it passes

between them, carrying them away in a shared proximity in which the discernibility of points disappears.

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 293-294)

Touches trace bodies and draw them out (and in) to existence, constituting the entirety of the body in its life and in its death. The body is solely made up of touches, traces, and scars. These events may be represented and expressed in various manners (the expressive politics of ressentiment in Fascism, the reflective display of institutionally suffered violence in the Punk's displays of ('self-')mutilation--two very different meanings in the display of the swastika, for example). Production and flight etch the body into its being and into its becomings. The body is a diagram sketched into the future, its beings and becomings simultaneously drawn before it, behind it, to the side of it, and, of course, through it at any one moment. As the Body without Organs, it is diagrammatically distributed into its positions and openings in space. The specificity of the body's traces, its withdrawals, its turnings and its openings--the folds that encompass and compose the body--determine the possibilities for subjectivity. The body's intimacies lead time and necessarily determine the space, politics, and history of both the individual and the group

Concrete machines and information

As Guattari (1984: 159) points out in his essay 'Concrete Machines,' the production which creates part-objects (as psychoanalysis understands such object in terms of phantasy and projection) is not attributable to abstract machines alone (for example, phallocentric expectations in the psychoanalytic session). Such productions must rise from the bottom up, as it were, in order to function as true. Concrete relations and concrete productions validate abstract machines as much as abstract machines produce conditions through which concrete relations may be organized, understood, and examined. We have argued, however, that concrete relations have a relation to negativity and to withdrawal that lies at the critical limit of representational production. It is by means of this negativity that lines of flight become actual for the individual and that history moves according to something more than a progressive historiography. It is by means of the withdrawal of normative production and the reorientation of the subject in space that abstract and concrete machines are modified and habits, customs, and even institutions change.

Cooper, echoing ordinary language usage, writes that information differs from knowledge in the sense that it adds something to a territorialized body or Gestell of knowledge (Cooper, 1993: 285). Established production assemblages depend upon an excess to their system for their continued production. Consequently, such machines must endure comparatively 'raw' materials which pass through their lines of production. Because all production machines, no matter how abstract or how institutionalized, function in a world of excess, such machines are dependent upon

concrete relations which escape them. This may seem an outrageous claim, but we should consider that even those most hermetic and totalitarian of institutions, such as the church and the military, must recruit from outside themselves and must reply to the societies that lie around them in order to maintain and obtain 'truth' (even if the criteria for this 'truth' originates in prior structurations and is empirically undeterminable). Even that most abstract of production assemblages, the concept of 'God,' has shown a grudging will to change, for example, within the institution of the Catholic Church.

Unlike 'knowledge,' our grammar of 'information' suggests that information caries with it a certain amount of undecidability. This undecidability in relation to knowledge paradigms and knowledge production is what gives information its connotations of 'newness' and 'rawness' and gives it value for the validation, growth, or even 'revolution' (in Kuhn's sense) of knowledge paradigms. Experiments must contain the possibility of producing information which invalidates, as well as validates, theoretical assumptions and claims, otherwise science remains at the level of pure speculation and has no explanatory power. Diagrammatics of agency are not structural because they begin with concrete relations. They are at a 'lower' level than the most abstract of production machines, but even the most abstract productions must allow information to pass through them, if only to prove themselves, at least for the time being, true.

Information must always contain the possibility of detrimentally infecting the production machines for which it is the raw material or source. These is always an ontological risk in becoming informed (making diagrams is both potential and risky). Information must be capable of 'infecting' lines of production so as to newly charge them with meaning. Reaction formations may occur so as crush information. The US military establishment, for example, may institute unenforceable rules ("Don't ask, don't tell") regulating the nature and action of homosexuality in order to prevent the illumination of the traditional role (repressed) homosexual libido plays in forming combat units of men. Such reaction formations are inevitably overdetermined when the information proves dangerous to the institutions's main tenets for production. (For a discussion of the role of homosexual libido in traditional military and church institutions, see Freud, 1959.)

Information is not only that which fuels the production of knowledge, but as synthetic and as not fully predictable it shows the limits of territorialized production machines, threatening to carry them away along radical lines of flight. Fascist political bodies depend most upon benign mass consensus, because it is through consensus that the production of information from concrete relations can be controlled and the abstract machines of the State can best be safeguarded. The tradition censorship of content (as opposed to the censorship of syntax and form) is a means of controlling production from the top down, and it is always doomed to failure because concrete relations exceed ideologies of the State. When concrete lines of escape and the proliferation of diagrams are formally controlled by moral and aesthetic beliefs, however, the critical limits of the State machinery never

appear, and thus, they can never be understood as strategically threatened. Illegalities are barred from the start at the level of concrete relations and production. Negative space is marginalized or blotted out of 'rational' productive experience so that the flights of subjective agents are trivialized and, thus, history never occurs except within the confines of an already predictable historiography.

Conclusion

What can we now say about bodies, including those which are known as 'organizations'?

First, bodies are results of the affective relations of already existing bodies, of heterogeneity and negativity (as well as, of course, positive production) in and as space, of the operation of forces in organizing, producing, and extending bodies and of the opening of bodies to one another so that production lines are verified, changed, resisted, transversely crossed and radicalized.

Second, bodies occur through previous, current, and future relations with other bodies in space and in the construction of space. Group psychologies and social and political experiences help determine the form and content of a body's composition in the past, present, and future. Negative space must be opened and allowed to exist in order for lines of flight to develop beyond what is the norm. Without such space, history becomes closed, static, repetitive and eventually it is determined to be nihilistic and consequently treated in an apocalyptic manner. (This is the banal consensus and the death drive which ultimately takes the form of fascist organization.)

Third, information is not neutral and not without expression; information is produced by a relation of bodies in and as space. Information's potential for writing upon those bodies and transforming them is a question of the construction and allowance of space and information by bodies and forces of production, and it is a function of the openings of bodies for flight. Information may radically transform those bodies or those bodies may strongly territorialize information by appropriating it or by marginalizing or negating it. This latter strategy is not only dependent upon prior codings at the level of the individual (for example, individual tastes, habits, and memory), but it depends upon the sanction of institutions, structures or groups in order to produce the rule of exclusion by law.

Considerations of beings--'humans,' 'animals,' 'technological,' 'natural'--must interrogate subjects and objects first of all as co-present beings, not only according to their being together (Mitsein), but according to their becoming, in-between. Such interrogations must take account of the organization of space and the function of particular bodies in constructing and determining it.

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